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Return to Vermont Yankee
And the Foreclosure of
Judicial Review of the
NRC's Generic Rulemaking:
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council
I. Introduction
In an unanimous decision' the Supreme Court upheld the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Table S-3 Rule,
overruling the lower court's substantive review of the Rule2
based on the guidelines of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 3 The Table S-3 Rule, a generic rule which dictates
how nuclear power plant licensing boards are to consider
the environmental effects associated with the nuclear fuel
cycle, was also the subject of a previous litigation. 4 In
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council5 the Court invalidated the procedural
review by the same lower court, holding that NRC has
the discretion to formulate its own rulemaking process.6 The
issue raised in this note is whether the Supreme Court has
placed NRC's generic rule beyond the reach of the reviewing
court.
1. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct.
2246 (1983).
2. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d
459 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as NRDC (II)].
3. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
4. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d
633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
NRDC (I) ].
5. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Vermont Yankee].
6. Id.
1
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This note discusses the series of Vermont Yankee cases
that were combined to form the single case Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The
relevant requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)7 and the formulation of the three distinct
Table S-3 Rules are explained. The main emphasis however,
is on the holdings of the courts and their rationales which
were based on the APA and associated cases. This note
concludes that the combined effect of these decisions may
lead to foreclosure of judicial review of NRC's generic
rulemaking.
II. Background
A. NEPA's Requirement
Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA requires federal agencies to
consider the environmental impact of any major federal
action. 8 It has been established that the licensing of a
nuclear power plant constitutes a major federal action 9 and
must, therefore, comply with the requirements of NEPA.10
The initial controversy arose when the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) sought to have the environmental
effects of solid nuclear wastes considered in the operating
license proceeding for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station.11 NRDC maintained that these effects should be
encompassed in the environmental impact statement (EIS)
required by NEPA. This request was denied by the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) 12 which stated that it
was not necessary tc consider the effects of disposal of solid
nuclear wastes at the licensing decision level. On appeal by
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
9. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 538-39 (1978).
10. NRDC (I), supra note 4, at 640.
11. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 468.
12. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station), 4 A.E.C. 930 (1972).
1983]
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NRDC to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board,
the decision of ASLB was upheld.13
B. The Original Table S-3 Rule
In response to NRDC's challenge, NRC initiated
rulemaking proceedings to reconsider whether the
environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle should be
included in the cost-benefit analysis involved in the
licensing decision for individual reactors. 14 NRC adopted
an alternative which allowed for the consideration of these
effects by including a Table S-3 in the EIS for each light
water nuclear reactor.15
First adopted in 1974, the Table S-3 was a generic rule
promulgated after extensive informal rulemaking
proceedings.16 The Table S-3 consisted of a "numerical
compilation of the estimated resources used and effluents
released by fuel activities supporting a year's operation of a
typical light-water reactor."' 17 This original version of the
Table S-3 Rule declared that in environmental impact
statements for individual licensing proceedings the
environmental costs of the fuel cycle "shall be as set forth"
in Table S-3 and that "[n]o further discussion of such
environmental effects shall be required."' 8
However, no numerical entry for the environmental
effects of storing solid nuclear wastes were contained in the
original Table S-3.19 Despite existing uncertainties, 20 NRC
13. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station), 6 A.E.C. 130 (1973) (approving Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's
license).
14. 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191 (1972).
15. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188-91 (1974).
16. Id.
17. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S.
Ct. 2246, 2249 (1983).
18. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188, 14,191 n.15(a) (1974).
19. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 466 n.11.
20. Two major uncertainties are excluded from the zero-release assumption: "1)
uncertainty concerning the integrity of the permanent repository, if such repository
is ever built; and 2) uncertainty over whether and when such a repository, or
3
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staff believed that the technology would be developed to
isolate the wastes from the environment by burial in deep-
bedded salt repositories. 21 The assumption that the
integrity of these repositories would not be breached and
that they would therefore completely contain these wastes
indefinitely is termed the "zero-release" assumption.22
Because of the uncertainties surrounding the zero-release
assumption, NRDC challenged both the adoption of the
original Table S-3 Rule and the approval of Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Station's operating license.23 The
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit)
held that the rulemaking was based on a cursory
development of the facts and was therefore arbitrary and
capricious. 24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 25
C. Formulation of the Interim and Final Table S-3 Rules
While Vermont Yankee was pending in the Supreme
Court, NRC conducted additional proceedings to review the
waste management and disposal aspects of the Table S-3
Rule and to develop a revised and adequately supported fuel
cycle rule. 26 The result was the adoption of an interim Table
equivalent system of disposal, will be developed." These uncertainties create the
environmental risk (cost) "that [the] wastes created by the plant will eventually
damage the environment by emitting radiological effluents from a faulty
permanent repository" and "that [the] waste created by the plant will have to
remain in another type of repository-possibly on site-and emit radiological
effluents prior to permanent disposal." NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 483. Id., nn. 109
& 123 (uncertainties of storage of nuclear wastes in a Retrievable Surface Storage
Facility).
21. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 469 n.26, citing Environmental Survey of the
Uranium Fuel Cycle (WASH-1248, April, 1974) at S-23 ("the facility will be
designed to prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactive material to
the environment under all credible environmental conditions and human
actions").
22. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2250 (1983).
23. The consolidation of these actions resulted in NRDC (I), supra note 4.
24. NRDC (I), supra note 4, at 655.
25. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
26. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,849 (1976).
19831 203
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S-3 Rule which NRDC immediately challenged. NRC
reopened the hearings to determine whether the interim rule
should be finalized or altered.27 This resulted in minor
adjustments to the table's numerical values. 28 The final
Table S-3 was also challenged by the NRDC. 29 This action
was stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in
Vermont Yankee.
D. Consolidation of Vermont Yankee and NRDC (II)
Following the initiation of this second action by NRDC,
the Supreme Court decided Vermont Yankee. Holding that
the D.C. Circuit's procedural review was improper and
intrusive into the agency's decisionmaking process 30 the
Supreme Court remanded the case. It directed the D.C.
Circuit to review the rule "as the APA provides." 31 This
remand of the challenge to the original rule was
consolidated with NRDC's subsequent challenge of both the
interim and final rules.32
Following the mandate of the Supreme Court, the D.C.
Circuit reviewed the Table S-3 Rule according to the
applicable provisions of the APA.33 Analyzing the rule as
either a finding of fact or as an agency decisionmaking
device, the D.C. Circuit determined that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious in the light of the surrounding
uncertainties. 34 Thus the rule was invalidated for the
second time.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., intervenors in the original
action, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to review
27. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,987 (1977).
28. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 474.
29. Id.
30. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 535 (1978).
31. Id. at 549.
32. NRDC (II), supra note 2.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)(1982) provides that a reviewing court shall "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be...
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of [agency] discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."
34. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 483.
5
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the D.C. Circuit's decision. Although the question brought
before the Court concerned all three versions of the Table S-
3 Rule,35 the underlying issue was whether the D.C. Circuit
had exceeded its judicial limits by impermissibly ruling on
the substance of NRC's decision. 36
III. Decision of the D.C. Circuit
A. Review of Vermont Yankee
The decision of the D.C. Circuit 37 is best understood in the
context of the Vermont Yankee 38 rationale. In Vermont
Yankee the question before the Court was whether the Table
S-3 Rules, by inadequately disclosing and failing to allow
for proper consideration of the uncertainties underlying the
environmental impacts embodied in the final Table,
violated NEPA and where therefore invalid. 39 More
specifically, the question turned on the decision of NRC
that, despite substantial and significant uncertainties, the
effect of the disposal of solid nuclear wastes need not be
considered in licensing decisions because the probabilities
favor that these effects would be zero. 40 In NRDC (I),4 1 the
D.C. Circuit found that this assumption was
unsubstantiated and inadequately supported by the
record. 42 Although the D.C. Circuit was cautious not to
prescribe additional rulemaking procedures to NRC, 43 the
35. Many licensing proceedings were challenged on the basis of the original and
interim rules and were still pending on the issue of validity. See NRDC (II), supra
note 2, at 463 n.7.
36. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971)
(the court is not allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the agency).
37. NRDC (II), supra note 2.
38. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
39. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 475.
40. This is the "zero-release" assumption. See supra note 22.
41. NRDC (I), supra note 4.
42. Id. at 653.
43. The court was aware that it could not require additional agency procedures:
"We do not presume to intrude on the agency's province by dictating to it which, if
any, of these devices it must adopt .. " Id. The court, therefore, only suggested
that the procedures were inadequate.
1983] 205
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Supreme Court ruled that it had dictated procedures to the
extent that it had substituted its judgment for that of
NRC. 44
B. NRDC(II)
On remand from the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit was
directed to apply the "appropriate standard of review" 45 but
not to "stray beyond the judicial province to explore the
procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own
notion of which procedures are best. ' 46 Foreclosed from the
procedural review of its prior decision 47 and lacking more
specific guidance from the Court,48 the D.C. Circuit was
limited to deciding the case on narrow substantive
grounds.49 The D.C. Circuit reached these questions: 1)
whether the Table S-3 Rule was "not in accordance with the
law" 50 because it violated NEPA as applied to individual
licensing decisions, 51 2) whether the decision was arbitrary
and capricious based on a consideration of the relevant
factors, and 3) whether there was clear error in judgment.52
The D.C. Circuit scrutinized the key issue of the zero-
release assumption both as a factual finding and as an
agency decisionmaking device. In its analysis of this
assumption as a factual finding, the court relied on Izaak
Walton League of America v. Marsh 3 and Alaska v.
44. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978), citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390,410 n.21 (1976).
45. Id. at 549.
46. Id.
47. NRDC (I), supra note 4.
48. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978). The Court gave only general
direction to APA for review on remand, and did not state any specific format.
49. It is generally recognized that there are basically two types of review:
procedural and substantive. In the present case, foreclosure of review by one
standard left the other for subsequent review. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1310-14 (1975).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
51. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 475.
52. Id.
53. Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981).
7
RETURN TO VERMONT YANKEE
Andrus5 4 to interpret that the risk of an environmental
event is the overriding relevant factor 55 that NEPA requires
to be considered. The D.C. Circuit ruled that a court must
interpret a finding of no environmental effect as a finding
that there is no significant risk of an environmental effect. 56
Therefore, because of the uncertainty of repository
integrity, the conclusion that nuclear wastes sealed in a
permanent repository will have no impact on the
environment, as a factual finding, represents a clear error
in judgment. 57
However, the D.C. Circuit contended that the zero-release
assumption is better characterized as a decisionmaking
device.58 It maintained that NRC is free to implement
NEPA through generic rulemaking5 9 provided that the
rulemaking is based on the agency's reasoned judgment
concerning the relative weights of generic costs and
benefits. 60 Relying heavily on the foundation case of
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy
Commission,6 1 the D.C. Circuit required that the agency
consider and disclose the actual environmental effects it
has assessed in a manner that will bear directly on the
decisionmaking process. 62 The zero-release assumption
excludes uncertainties from consideration.63 Although
NRC did consider these uncertainties, it did not do so in a
manner that would either directly or indirectly affect
54. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).
55. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 479.
56. Id. at 480.
57. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
58. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 481.
59. Id. at 482.
60. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(b) (1983) and Note, Judicial Review of Federal
Environmental Decisionmaking: NRC Regulation of Nuclear Waste Management
and Disposal, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 355, 360 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Waste
Management] (traditional use of cost-benefit analysis that balances
environmental effects, the costs, of the facility with economic and other benefits).
61. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
62. NRDC (I), supra note 2, at 482-83.
63. Id. at 483.
19831 207
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licensing decisions. 64 Thus NRC determined that: 1) for the
limited purpose of the fuel cycle rule, it was not necessary to
reflect explicitly the uncertainties in the rule, and 2) it was
reasonable to base any impacts on the assumption which
NRC believed the probabilities favored. 65 The D.C. Circuit
found that these determinations constituted a violation of
NEPA 66 and were "not in accordance with law."67
The D.C. Circuit reached the same result under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 6 It concluded that an
agency rule stating that an effect will not occur in the "face
of significant uncertainty indicates either a failure to
consider a relevant factor or is a clear error in judgment."69
Because this is precisely what NRC did in promulgating the
Table S-3 Rule, the court concluded that the action was
arbitrary and capricious.
IV. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC
A. D.C. Circuit Overruled
In reviewing the decision of the lower court, the Supreme
Court stated that "[a]dministrative decisions should be set
aside . . . only for substantial procedural or substantive
reasons as mandated by statute." 70 The role of the courts in
reviewing agency action 71 was thus limited to determining
64. Id. (NRC held that licensing decisions should be made on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis that omitted the cost represented by the uncertainties).
65. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,369 (1979).
66. NRDC (II), supra note 2, at 484-85.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 485.
69. Id.
70. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2252 (1983), quoting Vermont Yankee, 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
71. APA generally prescribes two standards for judicial review of agency
decisionmaking. The first standard, arbitrary and capricious, is applied to
informal rulemaking and is regarded as procedural review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1982) The reviewing court determines whether the rule was promulgated using
adequate procedure and whether there was a rational basis in the record to support
the rule. This standard does not appear to challenge the substance of the rule and
allows maximum deference to agency decisions. The second standard, substantial
9
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whether the agency conformed with controlling statutes.72
An unanimous Court concluded that NRC had complied
with NEPA in formulating the zero-release assumption and
the Table S-3 Rule. The decision of NRC7 3 was therefore not
arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of the APA. 74
evidence on the record, applies to formal rulemaking and is considered a
substantive review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). The courts closely scrutinize the
record to determine whether all relevant factors were considered and whether
proper weight was given to each factor. Little deference is given to agency
discretion and the court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency if the
court finds that the rule, as a matter of law, is incorrect. K. Davis, Administrative
Law of the Seventies, §§ 29.01, 30.05 (1976); See also Note, Waste Management,
supra note 60.
Generic rulemaking is technically informal notice and comment rulemaking as
prescribed by APA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (5), 553 (1982); See also Note, The Use of
Generic Rulemaking to Resolve Environmental Issues In Nuclear Power Plant
Licensing, 61 Va. L. Rev. 869, 894 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Use of Generic
Rulemaking]. However, due to the technical complexities of most environmental
rules, and that issues of fact and law are often inextricably interwoven, the courts
of appeals have developed a body of common law to review generic rules that is a
combination of the two standards previously described. See Note, Judicial Review
of Generic Rulemaking: The Experience of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
65 Geo. L. J. 1295, 1315 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Review of Generic
Rulemaking].
Basically, the courts have attempted to achieve a flexible standard of review
that balances the need for judicial review of highly technical and complex generic
rules with the need for deference to an agency's experience and expertise. See Note,
Review of Generic Rulemaking, supra. This approach is often regarded as the
balance between procedural and substantive review and one easily sees that a
court would become frustrated in attempting to define its decision based on either
of the two labels. See Note, Waste Management, supra at 383. The standard that
the D.C. Circuit created is a composite in which both forms of review appear to
merge. See Note, Review of Generic Rulemaking, supra at 1298 n.22. This standard
allows for maximum flexibility for judicial review and results in common law
standards such as the "hard look," see NRDC (I), supra note 4, "thorough
ventilation," see Id., or a "reasoned decisionmaking" approach, see International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
72. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2252-53 (1983).
73. "[NRC] decided that licensing boards should assume, for the purposes of
NEPA, that the permanent storage of certain nuclear wastes would have no
significant environmental impact and thus should not affect the decision whether
to license a particular nuclear power plant." Id. at 2248.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/6
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B. Supreme Court's Analysis
Emphasizing the dual aims of NEPA, 75 the Court relied
on Vermont Yankee 76 and Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Hawaii77 to determine that the role of the courts is to ensure
that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed
the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision
is not arbitrary and capricious. 78 The Supreme Court found
from the record that NRC had considered all the data on
long-term storage of solid nuclear wastes 79 and disclosed
the substantial uncertainty related to the zero-release
assumption.80 The decision to consider these effects in a
generic rule was held to be within the discretion of the
agency s to which the Court gave deference.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit's
opinion that NRC violated NEPA by failing to factor the
uncertainties surrounding long-term storage into Table S-3
and by precluding individual licensing boards from
considering them.8 2 The Supreme Court reasoned that the
zero-release assumption would violate NEPA only if NRC
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding generically
that the uncertainty was insufficient to affect any
individual licensing decision.8 3 In analyzing this issue, the
75. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2252-53 (1983).
76. The first aim of NEPA is to place "upon an agency the obligation to consider
every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action."
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978).
77. 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981). "The second aim [of NEPA] is to inform the public
that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking
process." Id.
78. See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
79. NRC's adoption of the final Table S-3 Rule shows that it has considered this
material. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,367-69 (1979). See also 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1983).
80. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (1983). "[NRC] acknowledged that this
assumption was uncertain because of the remote possibility that water might
enter the repository, dissolve the radioactive materials, and transport them to the
biosphere."
81. Id. at 2254-55.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2255. In this instance, the Court was not questioning whether the zero-
release assumption itself was arbitrary and capricious. NRC had decided that the
uncertainties were insufficient to affect any individual licensing decision, and
11
RETURN TO VERMONT YANKEE
zero-release assumption was scrutinized in the context of
the Table S-3 Rule.84 The Court found that the Table S-3 Rule
was made for a limited purpose.85 Therefore, the zero-release
assumption, as a single value in the entire table, was offset
by conservative assumptions reflected in the other values in
the table. 86 In upholding the validity of the Table S-3 Rule,
the Court relied on the doctrine that greater deference
should be afforded an agency's decisions in complex
determinations. 87
The opinion characterized the development, despite
substantial uncertainties, of nuclear generation facilities as
a fundamental policy issue to be decided or delegated by
Congress. 8 The Court thus validated the zero-release
assumption as a policy judgment that was within the
bounds of reasoned decisionmaking and was outside the
limits of judicial review.8 9
V. Discussion: Foreclosure of Judicial Review
The Baltimore Gas Court, in reversing the D.C. Circuit
and in upholding the Table S-3 Rule, apparently
disregarded the effect of its former holding90  and
instructions on remand. 91  Had the Supreme Court
that this decision should have been incorporated into a generic rule. If these
decisions were enacted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, only then would the
zero-release assumption have violated NEPA.
84. Id. at 2256.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2256-57.
87. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
656,705-06 (1980). When a commission is making predictions within its area of
expertise at the frontiers of science, as opposed to simple findings of fact, the
reviewing court must be most deferential to the agency's discretion.
88. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2252 (1983).
89. Id. at 2257. "It is not our task to determine what decision we, as
Commissioners, would have reached." Id.
90. See infra pp. 208-09, the Court in Vermont Yankee, in effect, foreclosed the
court of appeals from procedural review.
91. Id. The D.C. Circuit was directed to apply the "appropriate standard of
review" in accordance with APA, but no specific guidelines were given as to what
standards were intended. However, as previously noted, supra note 49, the only
avenue remaining was substantive review.
19831
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acknowledged the invalidation of the procedural review of
the Table S-3 Rule in Vermont Yankee, it might have
decided Baltimore Gas by a different rationale. 92 Instead,
the Baltimore Gas opinion suggested that the D.C.Ciruit
had improperly substituted its judgment for that of the
agency. The effect was to disallow substantive review of the
Table S-3 Rule. Thus, both procedural and substantive
review have been precluded.
This result is unsatisfactory. It fails to give purpose and
effect to sections 702 and 704 of the APA,93 which manifest
the intent of Congress that agency actions be reviewable. It
also disregards the Atomic Energy Act 94 which provides for
review of NRC actions, including technically complex
generic rulemaking. 95
In holding that the Table S-3 Rule is a policy decision, 96
requiring that maximum deference be given to the agency's
discretion, the Supreme Court effectively placed the generic
rule beyond the reach of the courts. 97 Thus the Court failed
to seize the opportunity to clarify the standard of review of
generic rulemaking 98 and to provide guidance to the lower
courts in subsequent cases. The Court may in fact have
created a means for agencies to circumvent judicial review
by labeling rules as policy decisions. Baltimore Gas may
therefore signal the demise of judicial review in similar
cases of generic rulemaking.
92. As an alternative, the Supreme Court might have argued that the D.C.
Circuit had erred in its application of the substantive review standard. This would
have achieved the same result, yet maintained the integrity of judicial review of
agency decisionmaking under, at least, a substantive approach.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) provides that "a person... adversely affected.., by
agency action ... is entitled to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982) provides that
"final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to
judicial review."
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2996(j) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
96. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2257 (1983).
.97. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) states, "[tihis chapter applies... except tothe extent that
. agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
98. See Note, Review of Generic Rulemaking, supra note 71, at 1299.
13
RETURN TO VERMONT YANKEE
VI. Conclusion
The series of cases leading to the decision in Baltimore
Gas demonstrates the difficulties faced by courts when they
review generic rulemaking.99 These difficulties are due
largely to the lack of a specific standard of review' 00 or to
inadequate guidance by the courts or Congress.
Baltimore Gas marks a definite halt in the developing
standard of judicial review' 01 as the Court attempts to
retreat to the plain meaning and rigid interpretation of
NEPA 10 2 and APA. 10 3 The rule developed by the Court
would limit the scope of review to the minimum standards of
procedural adequacy and rational basis which are required
by the APA.104 In addition, the Court seemingly applied the
"reasoned decisionmaking" approach. 105 This may result in
confusion for the lower courts since the Table S-3 Rule was
actually validated as an agency policy decision. 0 6 Because
policy decisions allow for maximum deference to agency
discretion, this conclusion is inconsistent with the balance
sought by the rationale of the "reasoned decisionmaking"
standard.
Thus, Baltimore Gas does not provide the specific
guidance required by the lower courts in deciding cases of
generic rulemaking. More significantly, the invalidation of
substantive review in this case where procedural review had
already been foreclosed has placed the generic rule of NRC
beyond the reach of the reviewing courts and may signal the
demise of judicial review of NRC's generic rulemaking.
Brian L. Wamsley
99. See Note, Review of Generic Rulemaking, supra note 71.
100. See K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, § 29.01 (1976) (the
standard or scope of judicial review of agency rulemaking is ambiguous).
101. See supra note 71.
102. Brief for Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., at 29-34, Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
103. Baltimore Gas, 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2257 (1983).
104. "Our only task is to determine whether [NRC] has considered the relevant
factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the
choices made." Id.
105. Id. at 2256.
106. Id. at 2256-57.
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